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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“Federal Circuit”) delivered only seven precedential trademark 
opinions in 2006.1  This small proportion of trademark cases is 
consistent with the court’s docket in recent years.2  This year, the 
court addressed a range of interesting substantive issues including 
trade dress configuration,3 reverse passing off,4 and genericism.5  
Notably, two of the seven precedential decisions involved plant names 
protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act.6  
The Federal Circuit decided only one case in 2006 where the 
primary issue was procedural, rather than substantive.7  In that case, 
discussed below,8 the Federal Circuit sided with the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board (“the Board”), and affirmed its decision on the 
applicability of the res judicata doctrine.9 
This year proved once again that appellants face a stiff challenge in 
convincing the Federal Circuit to overturn the Board’s findings and 
determinations.  Of the eight Board decisions appealed to the 
Federal Circuit,10 only one was overturned.11  Also, the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 1. Go Med. Indus. Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In 
re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Syngenta Seed, Inc. v. Delta 
Cotton Co-op, Inc., 457 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2006); M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 
Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha v. 
Thinksharp, Inc., 448 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 444 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
      2.   See Stephen R. Baird, 2005 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 55 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1263, 1263 (2006) (stating that six precedential trademark cases were 
decided by the Federal Circuit in 2005); Bruce J. Goldner & Kenneth A. Plevan, 2004 
Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1181, 1183 nn.7, 8 
(2005) (citing four precedential opinions involving trademark issues delivered by the 
Federal Circuit in 2004); Roberta Horton & Catherine Rowland, 2003 Trademark Law 
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 909, 910 n.1 (2004) (indicating that 
the Federal Circuit decided eleven precedential trademark cases in that “particularly 
active” year); Robert Penchina, 2002 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 52 
AM. U. L. REV. 999, 1000 nn.1, 2 (2003) (stating the Federal Circuit issued 
precedential opinions in a total of seven trademark cases in 2002); Andrew Hartman 
& Lisa K. Koenig, 2001 Federal Circuit Trademark Roundup, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748-
76 (2002) (citing seven precedntial trademark cases decided by the Federal Circuit 
in 2001). 
 3. In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957. 
 4. Syngenta Seed, Inc., 471 F.3d 1269. 
 5. In re Pennington Seed, 466 F.3d 1053. 
       5.  Id.; Syngenta Seed, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-Op, 457 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 7. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha, 448 F.3d 1368. 
 8. See infra Section II.A. 
 9. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha, 448 F.3d at 1372-73. 
 10. In re Pennington Seed, 466 F.3d 1053; M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 
450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha, 448 F.3d 1368; In re 
Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006); El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc., 
201 F. App’x 773 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Stoller v. Sutech U.S.A., Inc., 199 F. App’x 954 
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affirmed rulings by a federal district court12 and the International 
Trade Commission (“ITC”).13  This year, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
in every trademark decision it published.14 
In 2006, as in years past, the Federal Circuit has designated a good 
portion of its trademark decisions as not citable precedent.15  Four 
out of the total eleven trademark cases were unpublished.16  All four 
non-precedential decisions dealt with the application of the In re E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co.17 factors for likelihood of confusion.18 
I.  SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A.  Appeals from District Courts 
1.  Reverse passing off 
Syngenta Seed, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-op, Inc.19 is the first of two cases 
decided this year that deal with seed names.20  This case involved a 
reverse palming off claim where the Federal Circuit needed to decide 
whether the evidence sufficiently supported the jury’s verdicts of 
infringement under the Plant Variety Protection Act (“PVPA”)21 and 
confusion or injury under the Lanham Act.22  Syngenta Seeds, Inc. is 
an international agribusiness that produces, inter alia, commercial 
crop seeds.23  This litigation concerned one such variety of seed 
                                                          
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Hart v. N.Y. Yankees P’ship, 184 F. App’x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
Miguel Torres, S.A. v. Bodegas Muga, S.A., 176 F. App’x 124 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 11. Stoller, 199 F. App’x 954. 
 12. Go Med. Indus. Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 13. Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 444 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 14. In re Pennington Seed, 466 F.3d 1053; Go Med. Indus., 471 F.3d 1264; Syngenta 
Seed, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-op, Inc., 457 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2006); M2 Software, 
Inc., 450 F.3d 1378; Bourdeau Bros., Inc., 444 F.3d 1317; In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957. 
 15. See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions:  The Scandal of Private Judging in 
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1444 (2004) (arguing that not publishing 
opinions amounts to private judging, a scandal that masks the true reasoning and 
analysis behind the opinions).  Professor Pether notes that the non-publication of 
opinions makes them “difficult to find” and diminishes or destroys the opinion’s 
precedential value.  Id. at 1437.  And, most jurisdictions ban or severely limit them 
for citation purposes.  Id. 
 16. El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc., 201 F. App’x 773 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Stoller, 199 F. App’x 954; Hart, 184 F. App’x 972; Miguel Torres, S.A., 176 F. 
App’x 124. 
 17. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 18. El Encanto, Inc., 201 F. App’x at 774; Stoller, 199 F. App’x at 958; Hart, 184 F. 
App’x at 973; Miguel Torres, S.A., 176 F. App’x at 126. 
 19. 457 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
     19.  Id.; see also In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 21. 7 U.S.C. § 2567 (2000). 
 22. 457 F.3d at 1274; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
 23. 457 F.3d at 1272. 
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known as “Coker 9663.”24  Coker 9663 is certified and protected by 
the PVPA.25  Companies selling certified PVPA seeds including Coker 
9663 must use “approved packaging.”26  Syngenta also owns the 
trademark “COKER.”27  Delta Cotton (“Delta”) is a grain elevator 
operator in Arkansas.28  Delta acts as a middleman for grain sales of 
local farmers by testing, grading, and storing grain.29  In addition, 
Delta purchases entire crops of wheat from local farmers, finds buyers 
for the grain, and takes a commission on such sales.30  All the wheat is 
stored in one large bin and Delta sells a mix of the wheat as animal 
feed in fifty pound bags labeled “Delta Co-Op Feed.”31 
Allegedly, Delta sold bags labeled “feed wheat” that contained 
Coker 9663.32  In 2001, Syngenta’s law firm hired a man who bought 
three bags of this feed.  An agronomist tested the feed for Coker 9663 
and found that they contained ninety percent Coker 9663.33  
Syngenta filed suit against Delta in 2002 for infringement of the 
PVPA and the Lanham Act seeking permanent injunctive relief, 
treble damages, disgorgement of profits, and costs.34  A jury rendered 
a verdict in Syngenta’s favor.35  The district court entered damages of 
$67,500 for PVPA infringement, $67,500 for Lanham Act 
infringement, and interest.36  The court also granted permanent 
injunction and costs, denying Delta’s motions for a new trial, 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remitter.37  Delta 
appealed.38 
The jury found that Delta violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) based on a 
“reverse palming off” or “reverse passing off” theory.39  Reverse 
passing off occurs when a company offers a trademarked good for 
sale under another designation, thus miscommunicating the good’s 
source of origin to consumers.40 
                                                          
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1272-73. 
 35. Id. at 1273. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1277. 
 40. Id. (citing Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 n.1 
(2003)). 
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The court first reviewed its own standard of review for the denial of 
a motion for judgment as a matter of law and stated that in Lanham 
Act cases, the proper standard of review is dictated by “the relevant 
regional circuit—here, the Eighth.”41 In this case, the two circuits, 
Eighth and Federal, had similar precedent—reviewing this case de 
novo since the district court denied the motion for judgment as a 
matter of law after a verdict from a jury.42  Since the Eighth Circuit 
only reviews issues raised in pre-verdict motions, the issues for the 
Federal Circuit were limited to:   “(1) whether the jury’s verdicts of 
infringement under the PVPA and confusion or injury under the 
Lanham Act were supported by evidence sufficient to sustain the 
verdicts, and (2) whether the district court correctly applied section 
2567 of the PVPA.”43  The second issue is not one that we will discuss 
in depth in this summary as it is unrelated to trademark law. 
The first issue directly relates to the issue of Lanham Act 
infringement, the reverse palming off claim violated here under 
§ 1125(a) of the Lanham Act.  In order to recover on a reverse 
palming off theory under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove four 
elements:  “(1) that the work at issue originated with the plaintiff; (2) 
that origin of the work was falsely designated by the defendant; (3) 
that the false designation origin was likely to cause consumer 
confusion; and (4) that the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant’s 
false designation of origin.”44 
Delta argued first that Syngenta failed to satisfy the first element of 
the test because it presented no evidence that Delta knew that the 
seeds it purchased from local farmers to sell as animal feed contained 
Coker 9663.45  Delta attacked the second element of the test because 
Syngenta’s claim included “no evidence of ‘false designation’ of the 
seeds, because the feed bags in question lacked ‘any designation 
(false or otherwise) regarding the origin of the seeds,’ and because 
there was no evidence that ‘the bags of feed sold to Mr. Robnett were 
intended for planting.’”46  Delta’s third argument was that there was 
no consumer confusion or likelihood of such because there was no 
evidence that Delta made any attempt to portray itself as the grain’s 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 1273 (citing Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2002)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1274. 
 44. Id. at 1277 (citing Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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producer.47  Delta’s final argument was that there was no actual harm 
to Syngenta “by the allegedly false designation.”48 
The court dismissed Delta’s first two arguments by holding there is 
no scienter requirement for Lanham Act infringement, thus making 
the placing of the words “Delta Co-op Feed” on the bags containing 
Coker 9663 “sufficient to constitute false designation.”49  Turning to 
the injury itself, the court noted that “the gravamen of the injury” in a 
reverse passing off case is the loss of advertising value in its name and 
the lack of business goodwill derived from the public having 
knowledge of the product’s “true source.”50 
In support of the jury verdict on the Lanham Act claim, the trial 
court stated that a reasonable jury could have concluded that the 
injury was the harm caused by the false designation of the seed in 
Delta’s bags.51  The trial court upheld the verdict in claiming that 
Syngenta was harmed by the deprivation of advertising value in its 
name and the lack of benefit in the public having no knowledge of 
“the true source of the . . . product.”52 
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the trial court’s conclusions, 
finding insufficient evidence to conclude that Delta’s actions had 
somehow injured Syngenta’s reputation.53  Since Syngenta’s name 
appeared nowhere on the bags of seed labeled “Delta Co-op Feed,” 
Syngenta sustained no reputational injury.54  The Delta customers 
were none the wiser to have bought Syngenta’s trademarked product 
and had thus, as the court said, “drawn no conclusions about the 
merits or quality of that product.”55  Finally, the court found that 
since those were the only harms considered by the jury, the court 
could not conclude that the verdict was supported by sufficient 
evidence of lost advertising value, lost good will, or any other similar 
injury.56 
The court also opened the door for another possible outcome in 
this case or a similar one.  The evidence for the purpose of the resold 
seed, which was for some reason unavailable or incomplete in the 
trial court record, could have been “highly relevant to Syngenta’s 
                                                          
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1277-78. 
 49. Id. at 1278. 
 50. Id. (citing Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 
1994)). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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Lanham Act claim.”57  The court cited two reasons for such relevancy:  
(1) much of Syngenta’s alleged harm is based upon the assumption 
that the seed, once resold, will be disseminated and thus deprive 
Syngenta of its market share; and (2) “whether a claim for reverse 
passing off is even cognizable when the rebranded product is used for 
a different purpose than, and does not compete with, the 
trademarked product.”58  The lack of evidence as to these reasons 
forced the court’s hand in this case, mandating reversal of the trial 
court’s denial of Delta’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on 
both the PVPA and the Lanham Act claims.59 
2.  Trademark damages 
In Go Medical Industries Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp.,60 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s “broad latitude” to adjust a jury’s 
damages award for trademark infringement.61 
Dr. Alexander O’Neil invented a catheter that reduced the 
likelihood of urinary tract infections.62  In 1985, he obtained U.S. 
Patent No. 4,652,259 (the “‘259 patent”) for the catheter.63  Go 
Medical Industries, Pty., Ltd. (“Go Med”), an Australian company 
founded by O’Neil in 1982, manufactures and markets catheters 
covered by the ‘259 patent.64  In 1988, Go Med entered into an 
agreement with Medical Marketing Group (“MMG”) granting it the 
exclusive right to distribute the catheters in the United States.65  
Though MMG initially purchased catheters from Go Med, it later 
manufactured the catheters itself and sold them as “MMG/O’Neil” 
catheters.66  MMG obtained a trademark registration for the 
“MMG/O’Neil” trademark for catheters in 1993.67 
At MMG’s urging, Go Med sued C.R. Bard for patent infringement 
in 1992.68  The district court granted summary judgment to C.R. Bard 
and held that the ‘259 patent was unenforceable based on 
inequitable conduct and for being invalid as anticipated.69  On these 
                                                          
 57. Id. at 1279. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 471 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 61. Id. at 1274. 
 62. Id. at 1267. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1267-68. 
 65. Id. at 1268. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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patent issues, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings.70 
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s reversal, MMG informed Go Med that 
it no longer believed they had a contract given the district court’s 
invalidity finding.71  In response, Go Med terminated the agreement 
and demanded that MMG cease using the “O’Neil” trademark.72  
MMG refused and continued to sell “MMG/O’Neil” catheters even 
after it sold its assets to Inmed International Corporation (“Rüsch”).73  
In 2003, Rüsch changed the name of its catheters to “Rüsch/MMG.”74 
Go Med subsequently sued MMG and Rüsch for, among other 
things, trademark infringement.75  The district court denied summary 
judgment on the trademark claims, finding a triable issue of fact as to 
“whether ‘O’Neil’ had acquired secondary meaning, whether the 
agreement between the parties included an implied trademark 
license, and whether the ‘O’Neil’ mark was abandoned due to naked 
licensing.”76  The district court found that factual disputes existed 
even though it considered MMG and Rüsch’s admission of a 
likelihood of confusion between “O’Neil” and “MMG/O’Neil” in 
their trademark infringement counterclaims to be a judicial 
admission on that issue.77 
At trial, the jury found in favor of Go Med on the trademark 
infringement claims.78  On the claim against MMG, the jury awarded 
$350,838 as a reasonable royalty, $3,873,236 for unjust enrichment, 
and $19,000,000 in punitive damages.79  As to the trademark 
infringement claims against Rüsch, the jury awarded Go Med 
$2,672,419 as a reasonable royalty and $32,265,634 for unjust 
enrichment.80  MMG and Rüsch both challenged the awards with 
Rule 50(b) motions for judgment as a matter of law.81 
The district court granted MMG’s Rule 50(b) motion in-part and 
granted Rüsch’s motion in its entirety.82  Regarding damages for 
trademark infringement, the district court characterized the jury’s 
royalty award as recovery based on profits rather than actual 
                                                          
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1269. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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damages—and therefore subject to reduction—because it was based 
on a speculative royalty rate.83  Rejecting Go Med’s argument that the 
jury awarded lost profits under common law, the district court also 
exercised its discretion under the Lanham Act and set aside the jury’s 
award of lost profits.84  Go Med appealed.85 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s damages 
reduction.86  First, the Federal Circuit noted that 15 U.S.C. § 1117 
provides for the award of profits, damages and costs, and attorneys’ 
fees in trademark infringement cases.87  The court stressed that any 
such award is “subject to the principles of equity”88 and that § 1117 
empowered the district court to reduce an award based on profits if 
excessive.89  The court noted that the jury’s royalty award “was not 
based on substantial evidence of actual damages” and that Go Med’s 
expert had “merely considered MMG’s excess earnings and attributed 
three percent to the trademark.”90  The court agreed with the district 
court’s assessment that it seemed as if Go Med’s expert “arbitrarily 
pulled [the three percent figure] out of the air.”91  The district court’s 
determination, according to the Federal Circuit, was supported by 
the evidence that the success of MMG’s catheters was more likely 
attributable to its marketing, the superiority of the product and its 
eligibility for the medicare reimbursement rather than the “O’Neil” 
mark.92 
The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s 
decision to set aside the jury’s award of profits and punitive 
damages.93 
B.  Appeals from the Board 
1.  Trade dress 
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that trade dress marks 
would henceforth be divided into two categories:  product 
configuration and product packaging.94  The significance of this 
                                                          
 83. Id. at 1270. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1268. 
 87. Id. at 1273-74. 
 88. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 89. Id. at 1274. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000). 
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categorization is that trade dress deemed to be product configuration 
must have acquired distinctiveness to be registrable, whereas trade 
dress deemed to be product packaging is automatically registrable.95  
The Supreme Court left the method for distinguishing between 
product configuration and product packaging to the lower courts.  
Until 2006, the Federal Circuit had not had an opportunity to offer 
its guidance on this legally significant distinction. 
In In re Slokevage,96 the Federal Circuit ruled that Joanne 
Slokevage’s trade dress for clothing was unregistrable because it was a 
product configuration and, as such, not inherently distinctive.97  The 
court affirmed the Board’s decision sustaining the refusal of the 
examining attorney to register the mark.98 
Slokevage filed an application to register the mark on the Principal 
Register.99  The mark consisted of “a label with the words ‘FLASH 
DARE!’ in a V-shaped background, and cut-out areas located on each 









The cut-out areas, which were intended to be located on the rear of 
pants, overalls, shorts, culottes, dresses and skirts, consisted of a hole 
in the garment and a fabric flap attached to it with a closure device.101  
Prior to attempting to register the trade dress, Slokevage applied for 
and received protection for various aspects of the “configuration,” 
including a trademark registration for the word mark “FLASH 
DARE,” a trademark registration for the design mark for the cut out 
design (registered on the Supplemental Register) and even a design 
patent for the cut out design.102 
The trademark examining attorney refused registration of the 
proposed mark because “it constituted a clothing configuration that 
                                                          
 95. Id. 
 96. 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 97. Id. at 958. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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is not inherently distinctive.”103  And though the trademark examiner 
gave Slokevage an opportunity to present evidence of acquired 
distinctiveness or to disclaim the design element of the configuration, 
she refused and argued that the trade dress was inherently 
distinctive.104  The examiner finalized the refusal to register the mark, 
finding that the clothing configuration constituted product 
design/configuration (as opposed to product packaging).105  Based 
on the Supreme Court’s holding in Wal-Mart,106 the examiner 
concluded that the product design could not be inherently 
distinctive.107  Additionally, the examiner noted that Slokevage could 
not avoid the disclaimer requirement because her configuration was 
not unitary.108  Her reference to the trade dress as a “cut-away flap 
design” in her application supported the examiner’s determination 
that the configuration constituted product design.109 
Slokevage appealed.110  The Board adopted the examiner’s finding 
that the cut-out areas constituted product design and accordingly, 
pursuant to Wal-Mart,111 Slokevage could not register the 
configuration absent proof of acquired distinctiveness.112  The Board 
then concluded that the trade dress configuration was not unitary 
because previously, Slokevage registered the portions of the trade 
dress separately.113  The Board offered to set aside its decision, in 
accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(g), if Slokevage “disclaimed the 
unregisterable holes and flaps portion of the configuration.”114  
Slokevage declined, instead requesting reconsideration of the 
Board’s decision.115  The Board denied Slokevage’s request and she 
appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.116 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that it applied a 
“limited standard of review to Board decisions, reviewing legal 
determinations de novo and factual findings for substantial 
evidence.”117  In so doing, the court addressed a preliminary issue of 
                                                          
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000). 
 107. In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d at 959. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (citing In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
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first impression:  is the determination of whether trade dress 
constitutes product design a question of law (as Slokevage proposed) 
or a question of fact (as the government contended)?118  Because the 
determination involves consumer perception, the court concluded 
that it is a question of fact “akin to [a determination of] whether a 
trademark is inherently distinctive or whether a mark is descriptive, 
which are questions of fact.”119  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
it would review both the Board’s finding on product design and 
whether the mark is unitary—both questions of fact—for substantial 
evidence.120 
On the substantive issue of whether her trade dress constituted 
product design, Slokevage attempted to distinguish (and hem in) the 
Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision, which also involved clothing 
design.121  She contended that her trade dress could not be product 
design because it did not alter the entire product, only a portion of it, 
and was, therefore, more akin to a product label.122  The Federal 
Circuit rejected these arguments, noting that the “holes and flaps 
portion are part of the design of the clothing—the cut-out area is not 
merely a design placed on top of the garment, but is a design 
incorporated into the garment itself.”123  Relying on the examples 
provided in Wal-Mart of trade dress that constituted product design, 
the Federal Circuit determined that product design “can consist of 
design features incorporated into a product” and that product design 
does not have to implicate the entire product.124 
The court also found instructive the analysis in Wal-Mart for why 
product configuration cannot be inherently distinctive.  Applying the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning from Wal-Mart, the Federal Circuit 
reasoned that: 
unlike a trademark whose “predominant function” remains source 
identification, product design often serves other functions, such as 
rendering the “product itself more useful or more appealing.”  The 
design at issue here can serve such utilitarian and aesthetic 
functions.  For example, consumers may purchase Slokevage’s 
clothing for the utilitarian purpose of wearing a garment or 
                                                          
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (citing Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc. involved “a line of spring/summer 
one-piece seersucker [children’s] outfits decorated with appliqués of hearts, flowers, 
fruits, and the like.”  529 U.S. 205, 207 (2000). 
 122. In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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because they find the appearance of the garment particularly 
desirable.  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Wal-
Mart, in such cases when the purchase implicates a utilitarian or 
aesthetic purpose, rather than a source-identifying function, it is 
appropriate to require proof of acquired distinctiveness.125 
Specifically, the court noted that Slokevage’s design could serve 
both aesthetic and utilitarian functions and that it was, therefore, 
“appropriate to require proof of acquired distinctiveness.”126  
Moreover, the court noted that even if the case were close, Wal-Mart 
mandated that courts act cautiously and categorize ambiguous trade 
dress as product design.127 
Turning to the issue of whether the mark was unitary, Slokevage 
argued that the elements of her design were inseparable and, 
therefore, unitary.128  Thus, the examining attorney erred by 
requiring her to disclaim the unregisterable holes and flaps portion 
of the configuration.129  The Federal Circuit determined that 
substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that the 
mark is not unitary.130  It opined that “[t]he display of elements in the 
drawing of the trade dress, the applicant’s earlier registration of the 
words ‘FLASH DARE!,’ and the applicant’s design patent on the cut-
out area” belied Slokevage’s assertion that the trade dress was 
unitary.131  The court concluded that, while it is possible to combine 
the elements as to be inseparable, Slokevage’s trade dress was not 
unitary as shown by the separate locations of the words and design 
elements and the separate registration of the elements.132  The 
Federal Circuit thus affirmed the Board’s decision in all respects.133 
2.  Genericness 
In In re Pennington Seed, Inc.,134 the second seed name case this year, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s refusal to register the term 
“Rebel” as a trademark for grass seed.135  The court held that the 
Board properly concluded that the applied-for mark was a generic 
designation and, accordingly, was not entitled to registration.136 
                                                          
 125. Id. (citation omitted). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 962-63. 
 129. Id. at 963. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  The Federal Circuit has since denied re-hearing en banc. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 466 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 135. Id. at 1054-55. 
 136. Id. at 1055. 
TRADEMARK.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:20:35 AM 
1000 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
KRB Seed Company, LLC (“KRB”) applied to register the word 
“Rebel” as a trademark for grass seed in 2001.137  Prior to filing its 
application, KRB designated “Rebel” as the varietal name for the 
grass seed that was protected by a plant variety protection certificate 
(the “variety certificate”).138  The trademark examining attorney 
refused registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052 and 1127 
based on the long-held principle that a varietal name is deemed a 
generic term and thus incapable of the requisite distinctiveness.139  
KRB appealed to the Board which, at the trademark examining 
attorney’s request, remanded to address KRB’s claim of acquired 
distinctiveness pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).140  The trademark 
examining attorney refused registration under § 1052(f), and 
finalized his refusal to register “Rebel” as a trademark for grass 
seed.141  KRB appealed to the Board that affirmed the examining 
attorney’s decision.142 
The Board agreed that the evidence established that “Rebel” is a 
varietal name for a type of grass seed.143  Additionally, relying on Dixie 
Rose Nursery v. Coe,144 the Board re-affirmed the long-standing 
principle treating varietal names as generic and, therefore, not 
subject to trademark protection.145  The Board cited additional 
support for its decision in the Trademark Manual of Examining 
Procedure (the “Trademark Manual”), which instructs examining 
attorneys to refuse registration of varietal names, and the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (“Convention”), which provides that a name for a new plant 
variety must be designated and that the designation is its generic 
name.146  Finally, the Board rejected KRB’s reliance on TrafFix Devices, 
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.147 to argue that a claimed feature of an 
expired patent could still function as a trademark because KRB had 
to give a name for a plant variety.148  KRB’s application for a plant 
variety certificate was a clear indication that the varietal name is 
                                                          
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. 131 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
 145. 466 F.3d at 1055. 
 146. Id. 
 147. 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 148. 466 F.3d at 1055. 
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generic.149  KRB appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal 
Circuit.150 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that whether a 
term is a generic name for a good is a question of fact, which the 
court reviews for substantial evidence.151  On appeal, KRB first argued 
that the Board misconstrued Dixie Rose Nursery v. Coe152 to stand for 
the proposition that a blanket refusal to register a varietal name is 
appropriate because such varietal names are generic.153  As an initial 
matter, the Federal Circuit determined that substantial evidence 
supported the examining attorney’s determination, affirmed by the 
Board, that “Rebel” was a varietal name and, therefore, generic.154  In 
support of this determination, the court cited information from the 
Germplasm Resources Information Network website, information 
from the Convention database, and information from the 
Department of Agriculture—all of which listed “Rebel” as the varietal 
name for a particular type of grass seed.155 
Next, the court determined that the Board correctly decided that 
the varietal name “Rebel” is generic and thus not entitled to 
trademark protection.156  The court found the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning in Dixie Rose157 instructive.158  Dixie Rose involved a varietal 
name for a rose.159  The D.C. Circuit concluded that since the varietal 
name was “known throughout the trade, and listed in applicant’s 
catalog by that name,”160 the words had evolved from being originally 
arbitrary to describing a plant of a particular sort—not from a 
particular nursery or distributor.161  The Federal Circuit adopted this 
interpretation and determined that varietal names indicate a 
particular variety of plant, rather than the source of the plant, and, as 
such, are generic and cannot be trademarked.162  The court went on 
to reassert the well-established principle “that an applicant cannot 
acquire trademark protection for the generic name of a product.”163 
                                                          
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1056. 
 151. Id. 
 152. 131 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
 153. 466 F.3d at 1056. 
 154. Id. at 1058. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1056-57. 
 157. 131 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
 158. 466 F.3d at 1057. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (quoting Dixie Rose, 131 F.2d at 446). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (citing Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 
598, 602 (1888)). 
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KRB also argued that a per se rule against issuing trademark 
protection for varietal names is against public policy.164  The Federal 
Circuit disagreed, maintaining that the ban on registering varietal 
names is sound public policy because “those in trade ‘need to call it 
by the name that it is known or otherwise consumers will not know 
what they are buying.’”165 
KRB further argued that the Convention does not apply because 
KRB’s variety certificate was issued before the Convention’s effective 
date.166  However, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding 
that while the Convention was not controlling, the policy of refusing 
registration of varietal names was consistent with the Convention’s 
requirements and supported the examining attorney’s refusal to 
register “Rebel” as a trademark.167 
Next, KRB argued that the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), and 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Montrochet168 provide support for 
the proposition that a mark cannot be generic solely because it has 
also been used as a name for a product.169  The Federal Circuit first 
dispensed with KRB’s argument regarding the Lanham Act by noting 
that section 1064(3) only pertains to cancellation of registered marks 
and is inapplicable to an instance where the mark was not 
registered.170  Similarly, the court deemed its decision in In re 
Montrochet unavailing because the mark in that instance had already 
been registered and had become generic.171 
Finally, KRB argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix 
Devices172 prohibited a per se rule against trademark protection.173  
However, the Federal Circuit found TrafFix inapplicable, noting that 
the case concerned “whether a claimed feature of an expired patent 
could acquire trade dress protection.”174  Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the TrafFix decision “did not provide a relevant 
analogy to this case” and was unavailing to KRB.175 
                                                          
 164. Id. at 1056. 
 165. Id. at 1059 (quoting In re KRB Seed, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156, 1160 
(2005)). 
 166. Id. at 1056. 
 167. Id. at 1059. 
 168. 878 F.2d 375 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 169. 466 F.3d at 1059-60. 
 170. Id. at 1060. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 173. 466 F.3d at 1060. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that plant varietal names, like 
“Rebel,” are generic and substantial evidence supported the Board’s 
decision.176 
3.  Likelihood of confusion 
Of the five cases analyzing the likelihood of confusion factors, only 
one decision, M2 Software, Inc. v. MS Communications, Inc.,177 was 
designated as precedential.  In M2 Software,, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Board’s finding that two companies marketing software 
with similar marks in different industries likely would not cause 
confusion.178  M2 Software had appealed the Board’s decision 
dismissing M2 Software’s opposition to M2 Communication’s 
registration of the mark “M2 COMMUNICATIONS” for interactive 
multimedia CD-ROMs containing information related to various 
healthcare fields, including pharmaceutical and medical industries.179  
The Board found that though the two marks were “very similar,” they 
were not identical because of the use in conjunction with 
“Communications” and “Software.”180  The Board found that the 
parties have different markets181 since M2 Software is involved in the 
music and entertainment industries exclusively, and M2 
Communications is involved in the medical, pharmaceutical, and 
biotechnology industries exclusively.182  The Board found further that 
even though both companies used CD-ROMs to communicate with 
their markets, they were still separate and distinct markets and 
“notwithstanding similarities in media platform, are different 
goods.”183  The Board found that any such overlap of consumers is de 
minimus at most.184 
In addition to the two companies operating in wholly unrelated 
industries, the Board considered the lack of overlap in consumers 
and the absence of other factors suggesting a likelihood of 
confusion.185  Thus, the Board concluded that there is no likelihood 
of confusion and dismissed M2 Software’s opposition.186 
                                                          
 176. Id. 
 177. 450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 178. Id. at 1380. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1381. 
 182. Id. at 1380. 
 183. Id. at 1380-81. 
 184. Id. at 1381. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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The court went through the likelihood of confusion analysis by 
analyzing the DuPont factors.187  The court reviewed the Board’s 
findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard and any legal 
conclusions of the Board de novo.188  Bearing this in mind, the court, 
under its own precedent, considered only relevant factors and the 
record.189 
The court first examined findings of the Board and, specifically, 
the weight the Board afforded to the unrelated nature of the goods 
in question and the different channels of both trade and 
purchasers.190  The court found there was substantial evidence to 
support the finding that the goods were not related by considering, as 
per prior precedent in Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products,191 the 
applicant’s goods as set forth in their applications for registration of 
the marks.192  The court looked at M2 Software’s argument that the 
Board “erred in declining to read the scope of its registration more 
broadly.”193  But the court disagreed:  “Such a reading would require 
us to improperly ignore scope limiting language within the clause it 
cites, i.e., language plainly limiting its registration to goods in the 
music and entertainment fields.”194 
M2 Software’s contention that the goods were similar failed to 
persuade the court as well.195  M2 Software argued that since both 
companies use CD-ROMS they are similar and likely to confuse 
consumers.196  The court easily disposed of this argument by pointing 
to the fact that the application and registration of the mark make 
clear that the relevant goods are not CD-ROMs generally, but CD-
ROMs produced for a particular field.197  Thus, M2 Software’s line of 
reasoning failed.198  Next, the court moved its analysis to the channels 
of trade and purchasers of the products.199  The court agreed with the 
Board’s findings, supported by substantial evidence, that the parties’ 
                                                          
 187. Id. at 1381-85; 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 188. 450 F.3d at 1382. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. 293 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & 
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 192. 450 F.3d at 1382. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 1383. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
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channels of trade and purchase are different with at most a de 
minimus overlap.200 
Subsequently, even considering evidence contrary to the Board’s 
final finding but included in its assessment, the court concluded that 
the “M2” portion of the marks were both identical and the disclaimed 
terms failed to “create any significant difference in meaning or 
commercial impression.”201  Thus, the court agreed that the Board 
properly weighed this factor in M2 Software’s favor.202  The court 
concluded that the Board did not err in finding that the marks were 
not identical when considered as a whole.203 
Lastly, the court considered the fanciful nature of the “M2” mark.204  
While the court agreed that the mark is fanciful, that factor was 
outweighed by the previous factors in M2 Communication’s favor 
listed above and did not affect the Board’s finding that no likelihood 
of confusion exists.205 
C.  Appeals from the International Trade Commission 
In Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. International Trade Commission,206 the 
Federal Circuit reaffirmed that the determination of material 
differences, which supports the Lanham Act’s section 1337 ban on 
the importation of “gray market” goods, is a low threshold.207  Gray 
market goods are “products that [are] ‘produced by the owner of the 
U.S. trademark or with its consent, but not authorized for sale in the 
United States.’”208 
Deere sells two models of harvesters in North America and Europe:  
the 5000 series and the 6000 series.209  Each series further divides into 
those sold in North America and those sold in Europe.210  While being 
sold under the same model numbers, the North American and 
European versions are manufactured with certain differences, 
including differences in labeling and safety features.211 
                                                          
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1384. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case.  127 S. Ct. 836, 166 
L.Ed.2d 666 (2006), reh’g denied, 127 S. Ct. 1363, No. 06-515, 2007, WL 506879 
(Feb. 20, 2007) 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. 444 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 207. Id. at 1321. 
 208. 444 F.3d at 1320 (quoting Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
200 F.3d 775, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 209. Id. at 1321. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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Appellants, a group of corporations, were involved in the 
importing and selling of the European version Deere harvesters in 
North America.212  They appealed the decision of the International 
Trade Commission (“ITC”) that affirmed the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge that since the European version of the 
Deere harvesters were materially different from the North American 
versions, appellants violated section 1337 of the Lanham Act by 
importing and selling the models in North America.213 
The court explained the rationale behind preventing gray market 
goods from coming into the U.S. market by quoting its previous 
opinion in Gamut:  “To the extent that foreign goods bearing a 
trademark have different characteristics than those trademarked 
goods authorized for sale in the United States, the public is likely to 
become confused or deceived as to which characteristics are properly 
associated with the trademark, thereby possibly eroding the goodwill 
of the trademark holder in the United States.”214 
The basic question in this and other gray market cases, therefore, is 
whether the foreign and domestic products are different, and if so, 
whether those differences are material.215  The statute does not 
distinguish between foreign and domestically manufactured goods, 
nor does gray market law concern itself with whether the trademark 
owner controlled the manufacture of the product or whether use of 
the trademark in another country was authorized.216  Rather, the 
statute makes unlawful “[t]he importation into the United States, the 
sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after 
importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that 
infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered 
under the Trademark Act of 1946.”217  Thus, gray market law is 
concerned with whether or not “the trademark owner has control 
over the specific characteristics associated with the trademark in the 
United States.”218 
On the question of material difference, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the ITC.219  The court noted that the threshold for such a 
determination is quite low.220  There must only be a showing that 
                                                          
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1320. 
 214. Id. at 1320 (quoting Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 200 
F.3d 775, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 215. Id. at 1321. 
 216. Id. at 1322. 
 217. Id. at 1323 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(c)). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
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consumers would find significant differences between the products 
authorized for sale in the United States and the unauthorized 
products.221  Thus, the court agreed with the Administrative Law 
Judge’s determination that the differences between the harvesters 
were significant and held that the judge’s finding was supported by 
substantial evidence.222 
Evidence of sales of European models sold at authorized dealers in 
the United States complicated this case.223  The court held that the 
unauthorized importation and sale in the United States of the Deere 
harvesters produced solely for sale abroad violates section 1337 only if 
the imported good is “materially different from all or substantially 
all” of the goods bearing the same mark that are authorized for sale 
in the United States.224  Thus, Deere bore the additional burden of 
proving that all or substantially all of the Deere harvester sales in 
North America were of the North American version and not the 
European version.225  The court found that Deere did not meet its 
burden.226  The court imputed knowledge of these sales of European 
models at authorized dealers to Deere and remanded the case for 
further argument on this issue.227  The court noted that on remand, 
Deere could meet its burden by showing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the sales of the European harvesters in the United 
States were so minute that substantially all of Deere’s sales in the 
United States were of the North American version harvester.228 
II.  PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
A.  Appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board 
1.  Res judicata 
In Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha v. Thinksharp, Inc.,229 the Federal Circuit 
had the opportunity to address a procedural issue—the application of 
the doctrine of res judicata.  In Sharp, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
Board’s decision that an applicant’s choice to contest only the 
opposition to its word mark was not barred, via the doctrine of res 
                                                          
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1324. 
 223. Id. at 1325. 
 224. Id. at 1323. 
 225. Id. at 1325. 
 226. Id. at 1326-27. 
 227. Id. at 1327. 
 228. Id. 
 229. 448 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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judicata, by a default judgment entered against it in opposition to its 
related application for a word-and-design mark.230  The Federal 
Circuit held that the applicant, ThinkSharp, Inc. (“ThinkSharp”) 
“was not required to litigate both oppositions in order to preserve the 
right to litigate one.”231 
ThinkSharp first filed an application to register the word mark 
THINKSHARP and later filed an application for the mark 
THINKSHARP-and-design.232  Both marks were intended for use with 
educational goods and services, specifically, in the areas of problem 
solving and critical thinking.233  After publication, Sharp Kabushiki 
Kaisha (“Sharp”) filed an opposition to the word mark application for 
THINKSHARP.234  Subsequently, Sharp filed an opposition to 
ThinkSharp’s word-and-design registration.235  In both of its 
oppositions, Sharp asserted that THINKSHARP was confusingly 
similar to and dilutive of its family of trademarks incorporating the 
word SHARP.236 
ThinkSharp contested only Sharp’s opposition to the application 
for the word mark THINKSHARP.237  It did not answer the word-and-
design mark opposition.238  Accordingly, the Board entered a default 
judgment for Sharp, sustaining the opposition to the word-and-design 
mark.239  Subsequently, after the Board proceedings were completed 
in the word mark case, but in advance of the Board’s ruling, Sharp 
asserted that the doctrine of res judicata operated to preclude 
ThinkSharp from contesting the word mark opposition based on its 
default judgment in the word-and-design mark matter.240 
The Board disagreed.241  It held that “the applicant was entitled to 
choose to pursue one registration and abandon the other, even after 
oppositions had been filed” and that an applicant is “not required to 
defend against multiple oppositions in order to preserve its right to 
defend against one of them.”242  In so holding, the Board concluded 
                                                          
 230. Id. at 1372. 
 231. Id. at 1372-73. 
 232. The first application was filed on February 26, 1999 and the second 
application was filed on June 4, 1999.  Id. at 1369. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 1370. 
 242. Id.  The Board initially rejected Sharp’s argument on the basis that it had 
failed to provide ThinkSharp with notice of its intent to rely on the default judgment 
and that it did not raise this issue until the close of the evidentiary period.  Id.  On 
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that the default judgment entered against ThinkSharp on the word-
and-design mark did not preclude it from defending its application to 
register the word mark.243  On the substantive issue of confusion, the 
Board found that there was no likelihood of confusion between 
SHARP and THINKSHARP.244 
Sharp appealed only the Board’s res judicata determination to the 
Federal Circuit.245  The Federal Circuit began its analysis of the issue 
by noting that the determination of whether a claim is barred by res 
judicata is a matter of law subject to plenary review.246  For res judicata 
to apply, the court stated that the merits of Sharp’s opposition to 
ThinkSharp’s word-and-design mark must have been “litigated and 
decided.”247  On this issue, Sharp argued that the legal effect of the 
default judgment was that the Board ruled in its favor on the merits 
of its pleadings in the word-and-design mark opposition, and “that 
Sharp’s uncontested allegations therein must now be taken as 
undisputed fact.”248  ThinkSharp asserted in response that “the marks 
[were] not the same, that the merits were not decided, that 
allegations in pleadings are not proven facts, that precedent is 
contrary to Sharp’s position, and that the Board correctly applied the 
rules and procedures of trademark practice.”249 
The Board, and ultimately the Federal Circuit, distinguished the 
precedent cited by Sharp.  Unlike the plaintiffs in Miller Brewing Co. v. 
Coy International Corp.,250 ThinkSharp did not adopt a second mark 
and file separate applications specifically to evade a prior judgment.251  
Further, the Federal Circuit found it highly relevant that the word-
and-design mark judgment was entered solely on default, not on the 
merits of Sharp’s allegations.252  After noting that “precedent weighs 
heavily against denying litigants a day in court unless there is a clear 
and persuasive basis for that denial,” the court stressed that the two 
marks were different, there had been no consideration of the merits, 
and “res judicata would deny ThinkSharp its day in court without a 
                                                          
reconsideration, and after Sharp brought to the Board’s attention a notice letter to 
ThinkSharp that was a part of the record, the Board nonetheless upheld its 
determination that res judicata did not determine the issue raised in Sharp’s 
opposition to the word mark application.  Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 1371. 
 249. Id. 
 250. 230 U.S.P.Q. 675, 678 (TTAB 1986). 
 251. 448 F.3d at 1371. 
 252. Id. 
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‘clear and persuasive basis for that denial.’”253  Finally, the Federal 
Circuit noted that although “the purpose of res judicata is salutary, for 
it prevents [litigants] from being required to relitigate the same issue 
against the same party in a separate action,” this purpose was not 
served in the instant case.254  The court reasoned that where, as here, 
a trademark owner is not seeking to evade a prior adverse judgment 
on the merits, precedent and sound administrative policy support 
“the Board’s reasoning that a trademark owner is entitled to choose 
which opposition to defend.”255  The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the 
Board’s decision.256 
III.  UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
As mentioned above, four of the five decisions in which the Federal 
Circuit analyzed the likelihood of confusion factors were unpublished 
and were designated by the Court as non-precedential pursuant to 
Federal Circuit Rule 47.6.  Local Rule 47.6(b) provided that “[a]n 
opinion or order which is designated as not to be cited as precedent 
is one unanimously determined by the panel issuing it as not adding 
significantly to the body of law.  Any opinion or order so designated 
must not be employed or cited as precedent.”  The Federal Circuit 
has strictly enforced this rule in the past, at one point even issuing a 
stern warning that it would sanction counsel for violating this rule.257  
In so doing, the Court reasoned:  “Violations of . . . Rule 47.6 which 
prohibits the citation of nonprecedential opinions . . . are all too 
frequent. In addition to imposing an unfair burden on opposing 
parties, violations of our rules also burden the court. The court must 
consider a large number of appeals each year. It can only conduct its 
work fairly and efficiently if counsel cooperate by abiding by the 
pertinent rules.” 
Effective December 1, 2006, however, this rule was superseded by 
Local Rule 32.1.  This rule, which reflects what is now embodied in 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, prohibits the court from 
restricting the citation of opinions or orders that it has designated as 
“unpublished” or “non-precedential.”  Thus, Local Rule 32.1 
provides, in relevant part:   
                                                          
 253. Id. at 1372 (quoting Kearns v. Gen. Motors Corp., 94 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996)). 
 254. Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
   257. In re violation of Rule 28(c), 388 F.3d 1383 (Misc. No. 774) (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 
2004). 
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(b)  Nonprecedential Opinion or Order.  An opinion or order which is 
designated as non-precedential is one determined by the panel 
issuing it as not adding significantly to the body of law. 
(c)  Parties’ Citation of Nonprecedential Dispositions.  Parties are not 
prohibited or restricted from citing nonprecedential dispositions 
issued after January 1, 2007.  This rule does not preclude assertion 
of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the 
case, and the like based on a nonprecedential disposition issued 
before that date.   
This language reflects that in FRAP 32.1.258  Though the Federal 
Circuit local rules now permit the citing of unpublished, 
nonprecedential opinions, it will not give its own non-precedential 
opinions the effect of binding precedent.259  Nor will the court 
consider binding the nonprecedential opinions of other courts, 
unless the rules of that court so require.260  Local Rule 32.1(e) now 
allows, within sixty days after any nonprecedential opinion or order is 
issued, any person to request, with accompanying reasons, that the 
opinion or order to be reissued as precedential.  If the request is 
granted, the court will revise the opinion or order to reflect its 
precedential status. 
Although four of the five likelihood of confusion decisions issued 
by the Federal Circuit in 2006 were designated as non-precedential, it 
appears that, in 2007, fewer decisions will be so designated or, if they 
are, such designations may be timely challenged and, even if 
maintained, the decisions may nevertheless be cited. 
                                                          
 255.  FRAP 32.1 provides as follows: 
(a) Citation Permitted.  A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of 
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions 
that have been: 
(i) designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” “non-precedential,” 
“not precedent,” or the like; and 
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007. 
(b) Copies Required.  If a party cites a federal judicial opinion, order, 
judgment, or other written disposition that is not available in a publicly 
accessible electronic database, the party must file and serve a copy of that 
opinion, order, judgment, or disposition with the brief or other paper in 
which it is cited. 
 256. Local Rule 32.1(d) provides:  “Court’s Consideration of Nonprecedential 
Dispositions.  The court may refer to a nonprecedential disposition in an opinion or 
order and may look to a nonprecedential disposition for guidance or persuasive 
reasoning, but will not give one of its own nonprecedential dispositions the effect of 
binding precedent.  The Court will not consider nonprecedential dispositions of 
another court as binding precedent of that court unless the rules of that court so 
provide.” 
 257. Id. 
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A.  Likelihood of Confusion 
1.  Hart v. New York Yankees Partnership 
In Hart v. New York Yankees Partnership,261 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Board’s decision to sustain the New York Yankees 
Partnership’s and Staten Island Minor League Holdings, L.L.C.’s 
(collectively “Yankees”) opposition to Leon Hart’s application to 
register the mark BABY BOMBERS for children’s clothing and 
athletic wear based on priority of the use of the mark and likelihood 
of confusion.262 
Hart filed an intent-to-use application with the Trademark Office 
to register the mark BABY BOMBERS for clothing and athletic 
wear.263  The Yankees opposed Hart’s mark “on the basis of their use 
of the common law mark BABY BOMBERS.”264  Citing Hoover Co. v. 
Royal Appliance Mfg. Co.,265 the court noted that in order to establish 
their ground of opposition under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act the 
Yankees had to show that they had “priority of use in the mark and 
that Hart’s mark, when used on the goods set forth in the 
application, would create a likelihood of confusion with the Yankees’ 
mark.”266  The court further noted that because the Yankees’ mark 
was unregistered, the Yankees had an additional burden of showing 
that their mark was distinctive in order to establish priority.267 
Initially, the Federal Circuit noted that it would review the Board’s 
factual findings concerning priority and distinctiveness for substantial 
evidence.268  After reviewing the record, the court determined that 
the Yankees’ mark was distinctive “rather than merely descriptive of 
the qualities or characteristics of goods or services” and noted that 
“Hart has alleged no specific error in the Board’s analysis.”269  
Additionally, the court concluded that Hart’s priority date was July 
23, 2001, the date he filed the intent-to-use application, and further 
endorsed the Board’s finding that the Yankees had used the term 
BABY BOMBERS in promotional materials to refer to their minor 
league affiliate since its inception in 1999, several years prior to 
                                                          
 261. 184 F. App’x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
 262. Id. at 974. 
 263. Id. at 973. 
 264. Id. 
 265. 238 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 266. Hart, 184 F. App’x at 973. 
 267. Id. (citing Towers v. Advent Software, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 945 (Fed. Cir. 
1990)). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 974. 
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Hart’s priority date.270  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the “Board’s finding that the Yankees have priority in the BABY 
BOMBERS mark is supported by substantial evidence.”271 
The Federal Circuit then addressed the likelihood of confusion 
issue, noting that it is a question of law that the court reviews without 
deference.272  The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board properly 
weighed the DuPont factors in determining the existence of 
“likelihood of confusion,” specifically, the similarity of the marks and 
whether Hart’s goods and the Yankees’ services were related.273  The 
court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that, when used in association 
with entertainment services involving baseball games, the mark BABY 
BOMBERS for clothing and athletic wear would be confusingly 
similar to the Yankees’ mark.274  The Board concluded, and the 
Federal Circuit ultimately agreed, that the marks were identical in 
appearance and sound and that the meaning and commercial 
impression of BABY BOMBERS would be identical in that it would 
suggest an association with the Yankees.275  Regarding the similarity of 
the goods and services, the court stated that “Hart’s athletic clothing 
goods were sufficiently related to the Yankees’ baseball exhibition 
services that consumers would likely believe Hart’s products were 
approved or licensed by the Yankees.”276  The Federal Circuit, 
therefore, affirmed the Board’s decision in all respects.277 
2.  Miguel Torres, S.A. v. Bodegas Muga, S.A. 
In Miguel Torres, S.A. v. Bodegas Muga, S.A.,278 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Board’s dismissal of Miguel Torres, S.A.’s (“Torres”) 
opposition to Bodegas Muga, S.A.’s (“Muga”) application to register 
the word-and-design mark TORRE MUGA on the Principle 
Register.279  The court held that the Board had properly considered 
the relevant factors from In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.280 and that 
“[t]he factors favoring Muga are sufficient, when balanced against 
the factors favoring Torres, to support the conclusion that Muga’s 
                                                          
 270. Id. at 973. 
 271. Id. at 974. 
 272. Id. at 973. 
 273. Id. at 973-74. 
 274. Id. at 974. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. 176 F. App’x 124 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
 279. Id. at 125-26. 
 280. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
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mark is unlikely to cause confusion as to the source of the goods to 
which it is affixed.”281 
Muga, a Spanish winery, has sold wine in the United States under 
the TORRE MUGA mark since 1997.282  Muga registered its house 
mark MUGA for wines in 1995 and sells wine under this mark.283  
Torres is also a Spanish winery and has been selling wine in the 
United States under the TORRES mark since 1964.284  Torres 
registered the word mark TORRES in 1970 and the word-and-design 
mark TORRES in 1986, both for brandy and wine, and it also owned 
the word marks MIGUEL TORRES and LAS TORRES for wines.285 On 
March 27, 1998, Muga filed an intent-to-use application to register 
the word-and-design mark TORRE MUGA for wines.286  On December 
8, 1998, Torres filed an opposition, alleging that the similarity 
between the mark Muga sought to register and its own marks would 
“create a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of Muga’s goods.”287 
In addressing the likelihood of confusion question, the Board only 
applied the first eight DuPont factors, reasoning that the other five 
were not relevant in this case.288  The Board concluded that the 
second, third, and fourth factors289 favored sustaining Torres’ 
opposition, and specifically found that the goods of both parties were 
identical (both parties having described their goods as “wine” in their 
registration applications), “the trade channels were similar, and the 
purchasers . . . were relatively unsophisticated.”290  However, the 
Board also found that the first, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth 
DuPont factors291 favored dismissing Torres’ opposition.292  After 
balancing the factors, the Board dismissed Torres’ opposition, 
                                                          
 281. 176 F. App’x at 129. 
 282. Id. at 125. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 125-26. 
 287. Id. at 126. 
 288. Id. 
 289. The second, third, and fourth DuPont factors are, respectively, the similarity 
of the goods, the similarity of established, likely-to-be-used trade channels, and the 
conditions of sale and sophistication of the buyers.  In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & 
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 290. Miguel Torres, S.A., 176 F. App’x at 126.  Neither party disputed these factual 
findings on appeal.  Id. 
 291. The first, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth factors are, respectively, the 
similarity of the marks, the fame of the prior mark, third-party use of similar marks 
on similar goods, any actual confusion, and the extent of concurrent use without 
evidence of actual confusion.  In re DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. 
 292. Miguel Torres, S.A., 176 F. App’x at 126. 
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concluding that there was no likelihood of confusion.293  Torres 
appealed to the Federal Circuit.294 
The Federal Circuit began by noting that it would review the 
Board’s findings regarding each DuPont factor for substantial 
evidence, and would review the overall holding regarding likelihood 
of confusion de novo.295  Turning to the first DuPont factor—similarity 
of the marks—Torres argued that the Board improperly considered 
the differences between the marks, specifically between the words 
“Torres” and “Torre,” and “should have understood that prospective 
purchasers will likely remember only the ‘focal point’ of the marks”—
the “Torre” or “tower” element.296  The Board, on the other hand, 
had found, and the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed, that 
“prospective purchasers would be likely to understand Torres’ marks 
as referring to either the surname ‘Torres’ or the plural of towers, 
while they would understand Muga’s mark as referring to either the 
surname ‘Muga’ or ‘Muga tower.’”297  The court noted that Torres did 
not satisfy its burden of proof, as the opposer, because it “provide[d] 
no evidence concerning which aspects of the marks consumers 
[we]re most likely to remember.”298  The court also noted that used in 
the singular, the word “torre” “does not connote the surname Torres 
or the Torres winery, but simply the word ‘tower.’”299  The court 
concluded that this distinction, coupled with the fact that Muga only 
used the word “torre” together with “Muga,” was sufficient to support 
the Board’s finding under the first DuPont factor that the marks were 
dissimilar.300 
The court next considered the fifth DuPont factor—the fame of the 
prior mark.301  Torres challenged the finding by the Board that 
despite “awards . . . from wine industry publications and newspaper 
articles praising the Torres winery,” Torres’ mark was not 
“unquestionably famous.”302  The Federal Circuit endorsed the 
Board’s conclusion regarding Torres’ evidence of fame, noting that 
the types of awards upon which Torres relied were common in the 
industry and that Torres’ news recognition and awards were probative 
of consumer awareness but “fell far short of the showing usually 
                                                          
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 127. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 127-28. 
 302. Id. at 128. 
TRADEMARK.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:20:35 AM 
1016 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
required to prove that a mark has acquired fame and the broad 
protection that accompanies it.”303 
Next, the court considered Torres’ challenge to the Board’s 
finding that the sixth DuPont factor—the use of similar marks on 
similar goods by third parties—favored Muga.304  The Board had 
noted that in addition to Spanish, “torre” means “tower” in Italian 
and Portuguese, before turning to Muga’s extensive evidence that 
several wines in commercial use included the word “torre.”305  Torres 
argued that this evidence was not probative in that Muga did not 
provide context (such as size of the customer base) for its examples 
of third party use and that mere existence of the registrations did not 
provide evidence of consumers’ awareness of the marks.306  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that despite the lack of context, “the sheer 
number and geographical distribution of Muga’s examples” gave the 
evidence probative value.307  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit agreed 
with the Board that the sixth DuPont factor favored Muga.308 
The court then considered the seventh and eighth DuPont 
factors—“‘the nature and extent of any actual confusion,’ and ‘[t]he 
length of time during and conditions under which there has been 
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.’”309  The court 
noted that Torres had not disputed that it produced no evidence of 
actual confusion, but rather simply offered “plausible explanations” 
for this lack of evidence.310  The Federal Circuit concluded that the 
Board had “reasonably inferred that the lack of such evidence, under 
the circumstances, favored Muga.”311 
Having upheld the Board’s findings regarding the DuPont factors, 
the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s conclusion that Muga’s 
                                                          
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id.  The evidence submitted by Muga consisted of: 
(1) menus from several restaurants in the United States listing such wines; 
(2) evidence showing that various retail locations in the United States and 
several online stores offered such wines; (3) an acknowledgment by one of 
Torres’ witnesses that he was aware of some of the other wines containing 
the word “torre”; (4) the Wine Spectator’s Ultimate Guide to Buying Wines, listing 
several such wines; and (5) four trademark registrations . . . for marks 
incorporating the word “torre” for wines. 
Id. at 128-29. 
 306. Id. at 129. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. (quoting In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 
(C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
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proposed mark was unlikely to cause confusion and affirmed the 
decision of the Board.312 
3.  El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc. 
In El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc.,313 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Board’s dismissal of El Encanto Inc. d/b/a Bueno 
Foods’ (“Bueno Foods”) opposition to registration of the mark SOY 
BUENO by La Tortilla Factory, Inc. (“La Tortilla”).314  This decision 
turned on an evidentiary issue and serves as a warning to trademark 
practitioners to heed the evidentiary rules set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 
2.122(d) relating to inter parties proceedings before the Board.315 
At issue was an intent-to-use application La Tortilla had filed with 
the USPTO to register the mark SOY BUENO for tortillas.316  Bueno 
Foods opposed the registration, asserting “that La Tortilla’s proposed 
mark was confusingly similar to several of its marks for tortillas and 
other goods.”317  Among Bueno Foods’ marks alleged to be 
confusingly similar were Reg. No. 1,538,311 for the word-and-design 






and Reg. No 2,374,448 for the word mark BUENO (collectively, “311 
and 448 marks”).318  In support of its likelihood of confusion 
argument, Bueno Foods included copies of its pleaded registrations 
to the notice of opposition with respect to 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d).319 
La Tortilla objected to the admission of the photocopies, arguing 
that they were inadmissible “because they did not show the current 
status of, and Bueno Foods’ title to, the registrations.”320  Agreeing 
with La Tortilla, the Board did not admit the photocopies into the 
                                                          
 312. Id. 
 313. 201 F. App’x 773 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 314. Id. at 773-74. 
 315. Id. at 774. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id.  37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d) (2006) provides, in relevant part:  “(1) A registration 
of the opposer or petitioner pleaded in an opposition or petition to cancel will be 
received in evidence and made part of the record if the opposition or petition is 
accompanied by two copies (originals or photocopies) of the registration prepared 
and issued by the Patent and Trademark Office showing both the current status of 
and current title to the registration.” 
 320. El Encanto, 201 F. App’x at 774. 
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record.321  Bueno Foods was unable to prove likelihood of confusion 
between La Tortilla’s SOY BUENO mark and its own 311 and 448 
marks absent this evidence, and consequently, the Board dismissed 
the opposition.322  Bueno Foods’ appealed.323 
The Federal Circuit began by noting that the applicable standard 
of review for evidentiary rulings is the abuse of discretion standard.324  
Turning to the evidentiary issue, the court noted that 37 C.F.R. 
§ 2.122(d) requires a party seeking to rely on its ownership of a 
federal registration in an opposition proceeding to “make the 
registration of record.”325  The party may do so by: 
(1) furnishing two copies of each registration prepared and issued 
by the USPTO showing both the current status of and current title 
to the registration; (2) appropriate identification and introduction 
of the registration during the taking of testimony; or (3) filing a 
notice of reliance on the registration during Opposer’s testimony 
period.326 
This is “sufficient to show that the registration is still subsisting, and 
that [the party] currently owns the registration.”327  Indeed, as the 
court noted, it generally does not consider registrations that the 
parties do not offer into evidence in accordance with 37 C.F.R. 
§ 2.122(d).328 
Bueno Foods conceded that it had not complied with the 
requirements of § 2.122(d).329  Nevertheless, it argued that the Board 
should have still considered the registrations to be part of the record 
“because La Tortilla had ‘fair notice’ that both the 311 and 448 marks 
were current and owned by Bueno Foods.”330  Relying on Tiffany & 
Co. v. Columbia Industries, Inc.331 for the proposition “that registrations 
may be entered into evidence by means other than those enumerated 
in 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d),” Bueno Foods argued that La Tortilla 
demonstrated its knowledge of Bueno Foods’ registrations by, among 
other things, “accepting Bueno Foods’ responses during discovery 
regarding the status and title in the 311 and 448 marks and 
                                                          
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 773. 
 324. Id. at 774. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 774-75 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2122(d)). 
 327. Id. at 774. 
 328. Id. at 775 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.123(l) (2006), which provides that “[e]vidence 
not obtained and filed in compliance with these sections will not be considered”). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. 455 F.2d 582 (C.C.P.A. 1972) 
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submitting those responses to the Board for the record.”332  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed with Bueno Foods and distinguished Tiffany 
& Co. on the grounds that “La Tortilla did not admit Bueno Foods’ 
title to, or current status of, the pleaded registrations.”333  Rather, La 
Tortilla had asserted in its answer to the opposition “that it was 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth of Bueno Foods’ allegations that it currently offers and sells 
goods and services under the 311 and 448 marks.”334 
Quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp.,335 the Federal Circuit 
explained that La Tortilla’s responses in its answer were valid denials 
that put Bueno Foods “on notice that its claim was being challenged, 
thereby requiring [Bueno Foods] to prove its case.”336  Despite this 
notice, Bueno Foods still failed to take any steps to make its 
registrations of record even though “it is incumbent upon the 
opposer to submit evidence in the requisite form to demonstrate its 
proprietary rights in, and the current status of, its pleaded marks.”337  
The court noted that the regulations provide “a simple, 
straightforward, and inexpensive” way of submitting such evidence.338  
Accordingly, because the Board was justified in enforcing its 
procedural rules, the Federal Circuit held that the Board did not 
abuse its discretion in dismissing Bueno Foods’ opposition, and it 
therefore affirmed the Board’s decision.339 
4. Stoller v. Sutech U.S.A., Inc. 
In Stoller v. Sutech U.S.A., Inc.,340 one of the rare cases in 2006 in 
which the Federal Circuit reversed (albeit in part) a determination by 
the Board, the court addressed several issues involving proof of 
ownership of federally registered marks, descriptiveness, and 
likelihood of confusion.341  Leo Stoller filed an opposition to an 
application by Sutech U.S.A., Inc. (“Sutech”) to register the mark 
STEALTH for “machinery, namely, lawn mowers.”342  The Board 
dismissed his opposition.343  Stoller appealed to the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 332. El Encanto, 201 F. App’x at 775. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. 931 F.2d 1551, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 336. El Encanto, 201 F. App’x at 775. 
 337. Id. at 776. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. 199 F. App’x 954 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
 341. Id. at 956-59. 
 342. Id. at 956. 
 343. Id. 
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arguing that Sutech was not entitled to register the STEALTH 
mark.344 
Stoller, proceeding pro se, raised a wide array of arguments in an 
attempt to reverse the Board’s findings.  First, Stoller argued that 
Sutech’s trademark application was void because Sutech’s parent 
corporation, and not Sutech itself, was the owner of the STEALTH 
mark.345  Hence, Stoller contended, the application was void because 
it identified the wrong party as the applicant.346  The Federal Circuit 
rejected this argument, noting that “between a parent and its 
subsidiary, ownership of a mark is ‘largely a matter to be decided 
between the parties themselves.’”347  In addition, the Federal Circuit 
endorsed the Board’s finding that Sutech was the proper party to 
register the mark because it maintained the necessary “control of the 
nature and quality of the goods identified by the mark.”348 
Next, Stoller argued that the Board should deny Sutech’s 
application because the mark was merely descriptive of Sutech’s 
lawnmowers.349  The Federal Circuit found this argument unavailing, 
noting that Stoller did not suggest that Sutech intended to evoke the 
dictionary meaning of the word “stealth.”350  Rather, Stoller had relied 
on testimony of Sutech’s vice president that Sutech’s lawnmowers 
resembled a Stealth bomber aircraft.351  The Federal Circuit found 
this to be at best an “associative connotation,” requiring a viewer to 
use her imagination to make the connection.352  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s determination that the mark 
was not just descriptive.353 
Stoller also made various arguments based on Sutech’s use of the 
STEALTH mark before its application.354  Specifically, Stoller argued 
that Sutech had only used the mark “Sutech Stealth,” and not 
“stealth” on its own.355  The Federal Circuit noted that because Sutech 
had filed an intent-to-use application, which does not rely on or 
                                                          
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 16:37 (4th ed. 2006)). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. at 957. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
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require past use, Stoller’s arguments regarding defective past use 
were entirely inapposite.356 
Stoller next contended that Sutech’s mark was unregistrable 
because it was functional.357  The Federal Circuit noted that the bar 
on obtaining trademark protection for structural features was 
inapplicable to word marks.358  Because Stoller’s argument 
misinterprets the relevant law, the Federal Circuit rejected it.359 
Finally, Stoller argued that Sutech was not entitled to register the 
STEALTH word mark due to likelihood of confusion, claiming that 
he owned twenty-six registered trademarks that incorporated the 
word “stealth.”360  As in El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc.,361 
discussed supra, this argument turned on Stoller’s compliance with 37 
C.F.R. § 2.122(d).362  The Board determined that Stoller had 
“established in this record neither use of the pleaded marks nor 
ownership of any validly subsisting federal registrations,” and so 
concluded that Stoller had “failed to show the requisite standing or 
priority of use on which to base his likelihood of confusion claim.”363  
The Board noted that Stoller had submitted copies of his registration 
certificates but that “those copies [did] not indicate the current status 
or title of the registrations, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d).”364  
Thus, the Board concluded that Stoller failed to prove that he used 
the “stealth” mark, or that he currently owned or registered the 
marks bearing that term.365 
On appeal, however, Stoller additionally asserted that Sutech 
stipulated to his current ownership of registered marks in the notice 
of reliance that was entered into the record before the Board.366  In 
the notice of reliance, Sutech stipulated to “[t]he true and correct 
copy of the list of attached STEALTH Federal Trademark 
Registrations which are owned by Leo Stoller and herein relied upon 
in support of the Opposer’s Notice of Opposition.”367  This list 
included a reference to U.S. Reg. No. 2,024,889 for the mark “THE 
STEALTH” for lawn sprinklers.368  The Federal Circuit noted that “on 
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its face the notice of reliance appears to indicate that Sutech 
conceded that Mr. Stoller owns the marks listed in the attachment to 
the notice of reliance.”369  The court thus held that: 
[b]ecause the Board’s opinion does not mention the notice of 
reliance or the stipulation contained in it, we cannot determine 
whether the Board overlooked that evidence or concluded for 
some reason that it does not satisfy the requirement that Mr. 
Stoller prove current ownership of the federally registered marks 
on which he bases his claim of likelihood of confusion.370 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded to the Board, directing 
it “to consider whether Sutech stipulated to Mr. Stoller’s rights in the 
‘stealth’ marks referred to in [Stoller’s] notice of opposition and 
whether this stipulation was sufficient to satisfy [Stoller’s] burden to 
prove his current ownership of registered ‘stealth’ marks.”371  The 
court noted that if the Board found the stipulation sufficient, it would 
then have to address the merits of Stoller’s likelihood of confusion 
claim.372  As of the writing of this Article, no action has been taken by 
the Board upon remand. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s trademark decisions for the year 2006 
produced some noteworthy precedent.  Among the more important 
rulings was the Federal Circuit’s adoption of a rule from the D.C. 
Circuit that plant varietal names are to be considered generic and 
unregistrable.  Additionally, the court had an opportunity to offer its 
guidance on an important issue in trade dress law—how to 
distinguish product configuration from product packaging for the 
purposes of registrability.  In its other decisions, the court reaffirmed 
principles it had previously set out in its case law and affirmed the 
decisions by the Board, the U.S. District Court and the ITC.  As for its 
unpublished opinions, although three of the four dealt with the 
application of the DuPont likelihood of confusion factors—the most 
common issue in trademark law, and perhaps why the court chose 
not to publish these opinions—one of them pertained to an 
unregistered mark and another case involved the doctrine of foreign 
equivalents. 
 
                                                          
 369. Id. at 959. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 
